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1 . Sill1MARY: The SG asks for cert. to review a CA 9 ruling -
that an indigent federal prisoner who is granted leave to proceed 
- ----------- - CCWli,,·HMiofloil 
in forma pauperis on a 28 u.s.c. § 2255 motion has a / right --to a free verbatim transcript without a particularized sho-wing 
The SG states that this ruling is in 
with decisions in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 
direct confl~) 
and 10th Circ~ ·c~ 
~-
-2-
2. FACTS: In June 1970, resp. was convicted of uttering 
forged currency (18 u.s.c. 472) and sentenced to ten years. 
Resp. alleges that his court appointed counsel did virtually 
no preparation or participation at trial and advised resp. not 
to appeal his conviction 11 because it would interfere with 
resp. 's motion to modify sentence." ~esp. did not a;epe9-l 
and the motion to modify sentence was denied. In March 1972, 
resp, (in max. security confinement) filed a pro se paper 
styled "Motion for Transcript In Forma Pauperis." This paper 
was returned by the DC with the notation that until resp. 
filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the DC could not 
act upon his request for a transcript. Respo then filed 
a "complaint" which the DC treated as a 2255 motion-2/ alleging 
that he intended to file a§ 2255 motion but was unable to 
purchase a transcript, and that he believed that the transcript 
would show that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict and that resp. had received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Resp. contended that he was entitled to a transcript under 
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(b) and 1915(b) (neither 
relevant and neither pursued here) and that his inability 
to obtain a transcript denied him due process of law. 
*/ The complaint alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 
and 139l(e). Neither the DC nor the CA discussed the problem 
of jurisdiction; the SC cone~ that there is jurisdiction 
pursuant to §2255, and that the request for a transcript may 
properly be treated as ancillary to that jurisdiction (pctn at 4 n.1). , 
\ 
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The DC granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and appointed 
counsel to representresp. in his request for a transcript. 
After a hearing, the DC dismissed the complaint for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The 
CA reversed by a divided vote (Hufstedler, Goodwin; Taylor) 
holding that "an indigent federal prisoner, permitted to proceed 
in forma pauperis, who has not yet obtained a transcript of his 
criminal trial, is entitled to such a transcript, upon request in 
order to assist him in the preparation of a postconviction motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." (petn. at 19a, footnote omitted). 
Rehearing en bane was denied, with five judges dissenting 
(Wright, Trask, Choy, Wallace, Sneed). 
The majority CA opinion, noting that it was addressing 
the question reserved in Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 286 (1970), 
recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) provides funding for a free 
transcript in§ 2255 motions only where "the trial judge or a 
circuit judge certifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous 
and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue presented · 
by the suit or appeal." It reasoned that the "not frivolous" 
determination was satisfied by the grant of leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis (citing Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 
438 (1962)), and that although the statute requires a particularized 
showing of need, Supreme Court cases decided since the passage 
of§ 753(f) have undermined this requirement (citing Britt v. 
'North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971); Gardner v. California, 
393 U.S. 367 (1969); and Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 





Courtlestablish a constitutional right to a transcript 
upon a showing that the moti n is not frivolous---: the CA stated 
that it was merely filling a "constitutional deficit not 
addressed by the statute." 
The CA also discussed and rejected the government's argument 
(taken from United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 
1964)) that: "In collateral proceedings • • • most of the trial 
errors warranting attention in direct appeals are not reviewable 
•••. • The usual grounds for successful collateral attacks upon 
convictions arise out of occurrences outside of the courtroom or 
of events in the courtroom of which the defendant was aware and 
can recall without the need of having his memory refreshed by 
reading a transcript or a partial transcript to support some 
ground of c6llateral attack • o • " 
In answer to the argument that its ruling will he 
unduely expensive, the CA notes that almost all indigents 
who appeal get transcripts (always when counsel changes, often 
when trial counsel is counsel on appeal), that around 90% of -----defendants plead guilty (resulting in an inexpensive transcript), --and that of those few prisoners who have neither pleaded guilty 
nor appealed, not all will wish to file a§ 2255 motion. 
These factors, says the CA, mean that its ruling is not 
unduely costly. It also notes that the cost to the government 
of opposing a motion for a transcript often exceeds the cost 




In ruling that the indigent federal prisoner need only 
show that his claim is not frivolous, the CA noted that 
it is in conflict with four other Circuits (see Benthiem v. United 
States, 403 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 945 (1969); United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th 
Cir. 1964); Cowan v. United States, 445 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 
1971); Bentley v. United States, 431 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971)--- to which the SG adds 
two more Circuits, see Culbert v. United States, 325 F.2d 
920 (8th Cir. 1964); Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325 
(10th Cir. 1965)). The CA also noted that it was departing 
from earlier CA 9 rulings, see Wilson v. Wade, 390 F.2d 
632 (9th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 396 UoS. 282 (1970). 
One sidelight~ the majority opinion specifically reserved 
the question whether the government is required to provide 
a transcript to an indigent who has been convicted but is no 
longer in prison. (Petn at 19a n.9). 
The dissent argues that the decision is contrary to 
existing case law (discussing only the prior 9th Cir. law), 
and that an indigent prisoner ·who has chosen not to appeal 
should not need a transcript to know whether he has a particularized 
§ 2255 claim. The dissent also states that since the complaint 
was brought as a declaratory judgment action (but see footnote 
page 2, supra) for SG's concession of§ 2255 jurisdiction), 
there is a sovereign immunity question whether the DC can 
order the printing of a free transcript in the absence of 
statutory authorization. This problem is solved if the ruling 
i$ that the sentence will be vacated unless a transcript is provided. 
•' 
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The dissent from denial of rehearing en bane states 
that an indigent is entitled to no more than an average 
defendant (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974), 
and asserts the belief that the average defendant would 
not purchase a transcript "in order to comb through it for 
~ ............. 
possible error." (Petn. at 24a-25a). The dissent from 
~
denial of rehearing en bane also objects to the panel's 
departure from prior 9th Cir. case law, stating that 
intervening Supreme Court cases did not undercut the earlier 
reasoning. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that cert. should be 
granted (1) because there is now a conflict between the 
9th Cir. and the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits; 
(2) because the 9th Cir. decision will have substantial 
practical consequences in that it will require much court reporter 
time for the preparation of transcripts; (3) because the 
decision is in conflict with the requirements of the statute; 
and (4) because the SG believes that the 9th Cir. is wrong on 
the merits. 
On the merits, the SG argues first that the government 
is required only to give the prisoner an "adequate opportunity" 
to present his claims (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (197~)), 
and that the prisoner is provided that opportunity in his 
right to receive a transcript on appeal. The SG states that 
lj 
collateral attack is different from, and more limited than 
appeal, and that therefore the indigent prisoner who choses 
.. -7-
not to appeal may fairly be required to make a showing of 
particularized need. The SG stresses that many errors for 
which a transcript is useful must be raised on appeal or not 
at all. Second, the SG argues that the investigation into 
particularized need is no more than the "average" prisoner 
would make before going to the expense of ordering a transcript. 
The SG also states that this prisoner needed only to tell the 
court why he believed he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel (stating that insufficiency of the evidence is 
not cognizable on collateral attack unless the prisoner is 
alleging that there was no evidence to support the conviction, 
citing Ga~er _y. f.'.ouJ:si_~na, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)), and that this 
requirement of a showing of need is not an undue burden. 
The response argues that the CA opinion should be 
read narrowly, to apply only where the non-frivolous 
motion alleges incompetence of counsel or lack of sufficiency 
of the evidence, both of which require a transcript to be 
properly argued and presented for review. Respo states that 
all of the other CA decisions are distinguishable, and thus 
there is no conflicto Resp. echoes the CA majority in arguing 
that there are no serious practical consequences of the CA 
opinion~ Finally, Resp. states his belief that the CA was 
right on the merits, and suggests the contrary result would 
raise constitutional problems such as conflict with the 
~uspension of habeas clause. Resp. does not engage in any 




4. DISCUSSION: There is a conflict in the Circuits. 
Resp. notes that all of the cases cited by the SG are 
from before Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), 
but cites no indication that the circuits are reconsidering 
their earlier decisions. Although resp.'s view of the narrow 
holding of the case suggests some interesting ways of reaching 
a limited holding that resp. is entitled to a transcript, 
the 9th Circuit clearly viewed its decision as having 
broader effect, and some of the cases in conflict are not 
distinguishable even from the narrow holding (..§..:_g_. Culbert v. 
United States, 325 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1964) is directly on 
point, and the PC in Cowan v. United States, 445 F.2d 855 
(5th Cir. 1971) certainly seems to lay down a blanket rule). 
Respo appears correct in his statement that the CA ruling will 
not have a staggering impact on the criminal justice system, 
but federal prisoners will be treated measurably differently . 
There is a response. 
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On October 6, 1975, the Court granted resp's Motion for leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis and the SG' s petn for cert to__.9 A .,9~ to consider whether a prisone r 
proceeding in forma pauperis on a § 2255 Motion has a right to a free, verbatim 
transcript without a particularized showing of need. This is resp's request tha t 
John A. Strait, Esq. be appointed to represent him in this Court. 
Mr. Strait served as resp's appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice 
Act in both the DC and the CA. Counsel's appellate experience includes preparati on 
- 2 -
and submission of briefs in this Court as well as state and federal courts belo,v. 
I 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.:§upuntt (!Iltttrl llf Ur~ ~tt?t .:§bdts-
~agfringhm. ~. QI. 2.[Jffe'!, 
May 7, 1976 
Re: 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom 
Dear Bill: 
In due course I propose to circulate a dissent 
which will not reach the constitutional question 
decided in Paft III of your opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
Respectfully, 
.. , ... 
'' 
, . 




JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
j5u:p-rnttt (!Jcurt cf tlrt ~nitth j5tatts 
~asllingfott, ~. QI. 20pJ~~ 
May 14, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom 
Dear Bill: 
I 
I shall await John's dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 














JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~tmt C!fttttrl of tqt ~h ~taln' 
~as-lftttghm. to. <q. 20ffe'!, 
May 18, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom 
Dear Bill: 
I, too, shall wait for John 1 s dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~tntt C!Jcmi o-f tqt ~ttitt~ .i'htlttt 
--rut~. ~- C!J. 211.;r'!, 
May 21, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom 
Dear Bill: 
I have now decided to concur in the judgment, but I am 
writing separately and briefly. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
; 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ltlrtl'utt C!Jourt of tl1t 'J)liritrb .;%,tat.ts 
'Ulcts iiingtmt, "!3. <4. 2flffeJ~~ 
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR. 
May 27, 1976 
RE : No .74-1487 Unit ed States v. MacCollom 
Dear John: 
Please join me in your fine dissent in the above . 
I 
Time permitting I may add a few words of my own address-
ing the constitutional question. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 











,, . " , 
•·. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~lqtUtttt Q}o-url of tlft ~b ~bdt~ 
JJ:ur.ftittghm. ~- Q}. 2llffe'!, 
May 27, 1976 
Re: 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
In rejoinder to Bill's response in his memorandum 
of May 27, 1976, I propose to add the following as a new 
footnote on page 4 right after the citation of Coppedge. Sin}[ 
Attachment 
I 
No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom 
5/ Although I have described that right as "almost" the 
equivalent of the absolute right to a full transcript on direct 
appeal, the difference between the two is significant. Before 
Congress amended§ 753(f) to provide for automatic availability 
of transcripts, Pub. L. 91-545, 84 Stat. 1412, the statute 
already authorized transcripts for indigent appellants, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 753(f) (1964 ed., Supp. V)] but, under Coppedge, supra, at 
446, the appellant was only entitled to a transcript sufficient 
to determine nonfrivolousness. The fact that Congress amended 
the statute to give the appellant the right to a complete tran-
script demonstrates (a) that Congress was aware of this dif-
ference, and (b) that recognition of a right in a§. 2255 context 
which is only "almost" as valuable as the right on direct appeal 
is consistent with the intent of Congress. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marsh1.ll 
Mr. Justice Blac1anun 
Mr. Justice Po ,ell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice R•hnquist 
Circulated: _____ -=_ 
JUN 1 1976 
Recirculated: _____ _ 
4th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 74-1487 
United States, l . . . Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the Umted 
States Court of Appeals for the 
v. Ninth Circuit. 
Colin F. MacCollom. 
[May -, 1976] 
MR. JUSTICE R EHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question of whether the re-
strictions imposed by 28 U. S. C. § 753 on the avail-
ability to an indigent prisoner of a free trial transcript to 
aid him in preparing a petition for collateral relief are 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in 
cop trast to ever;y other court of appeals which has ruled 
on the issue, held that such prisoners have an abso· 
lute right to a transcript. We reverse 
I 
Respondent was convicted of uttering forged currency 
in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 842 after a jury trial in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington. On June 4, 1970, he was sentenced to 10 
years' imprisonment. He did not appeal. Nearly two 
years later respondent, acting pro se, filed in the District 
Court a paper designated "Motion for Transcript in 
Forma Pauperis." This was returned to respondent 
with the advice that he must first file a motion pursuant 
to 28 U. S. C. § 2255 before the court could act on his: 
request for a transcript 
2 
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Respondent then filed a "complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment and Injunctivl:l Relief" in which he alleged 
that he "intends to move this Court for vacation of his 
sentence pursuan.t to 28 U. S. C. § 2255." He asserted 
that he was unable to afford a transcript, that a tran-
script would show .that he had not been afforded effective 
assistance of counsel and that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the verdict of guilty. The complaint 
further alleged that without a transcript respondent 
would be "unable to frame his arguments for fair and 
effective review." The complaint did not elaborate upon 
respondent's two asserted grounds for relief. ' 
The District Court treated this pleading as a motion 
under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, granted respondent leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis, appointed counsel, and held 
a hearing. After the hearing the court dismissed the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. Respondent appealed, and a divided 
panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, MacCollom v. 
United States, 511 F. 2d 1116 (CA9 1974), holding that 
respondent was entitled to a transcript "in order to assist 
him in the preparation of a post-conviction motion under 
28 U. S. C. 2255." 
II 
Congress has expressly addressed the question of fur-
nishing transcripts at public expense in 28 U. S. C. § 753 
(f), which provides in pertinent part : 
" . . . Fees for transcripts furnished in criminal 
proceedings to persons proceeding under the Crim-
inal Justice Act ( 19 U. S. C. 3006A), or in habeas 
corpus proceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend, 
or appeal in forma pauperis, shall be paid by the 
United States out of moneys appropriated for those 
purposes. Fees for transcripts furnished in pro-
ceedings brought under section 2255 of this title, 
74-1487-0PINION 
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to petsons permitted to sue or appeal in forma pau-
peris shall be paid by the United States out of 
'money apropriated for that purpose if the trial 
j~ ertifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous 
~ d that tlie transcript is needed to decide the issue 
presented by the suit or appeal. ... " 
The statute thus provides for a free transcript for 
indigent prisoners asserting a claim under § 2255 if a 
judge certifies that the asserted claim is "not frivolous" 
and that the transcript is "needed to decide the issue." 
~ 
The District Court, by its conclusion that respondent 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
implicitly decided one of these two issues against 
respondent. 
The Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary 
to declare § 753 (f) unconstitutional in order to grant 
respondent relief. Rather the court held that the sec-
tion "does not prohibit courts from .. . requiring the 
government to supply an imprisoned indigent with a 
free transcript before he files a § 2255 motion. Such 
a construction would fill a constitutional defect not ad-
dressed by the statute." (Emphasis added.) 511 F. 2d, 
at 1119. 
This is a novel approach to statutory construction. 
The general rule is that the expenditure of public funds· 
is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that 
public funds may be expended unless prohibited by 
Congress. Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 291 (1851). 
This particular statute contains a limited grant of au-
thority to the courts to authorize the expenditure of pub-
lic funds for furnishing transcripts to plaintiffs in § 2255 
actions. The fact that the statute does not "prohibit'r 
the furnishing of free transcripts in other circumstances-
is of little significance, since most such statutes speak 
only in terms of granting authority for the expenditure 
4 
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of federal funds. Where Congress has addressed the 
subject as it has here, and authorized expenditures where 
a condition is met, the clear implication is that where 
the condition is not met, the expenditure is not 
authorized. Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 
282, 289 (1929); Passenger Corp. v. Passenger Assn., 414 
u. s. 453, 458 (1974).1 
It is true, as respondent observes, that the statute, 
as currently written, distinguishes between habeas cor~ 
pus petitioners and parties proceeding under § 2255 in 
that only the latter must make a showing of need and 
non-frivolousness in order to obtain a free transcript. 
Thus while it is still true that the "remedy" afforded 
by § 2255 is "exactly commensurate with that which 
had previously been available by habeas corpus. . . . " 
Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 427 (1962), the 
right to pursue that remedy with a free transcript has 
now been somewhat limited by Congress. 2 Respondent 
1 Our Brother STEVENS would construe the pertinent part of 
§ 753f to 'make transcripts available almost automatically in § 2255 
proceedings .. .', post, p. 4. We think such a construction would 
do violence to the intent of Congress which clearly appears from 
the language of that section, ante, pp. 2-3. Congress did in that 
section make transcripts a,vailable automatically on direct appeal, 
but in the same section limited their availability m § 2255 motions 
to cases where the trial judge certifies that the § 2255 suit is not 
frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue 
presented by the suit. Our Brother STEVENS advances what may 
well be very sound policy reasons for furmshing free transcripts 
as a matter of course to § 2255 plamtiffs, as well as to convicted 
defendants pursuing direct appeals. But 1t 1s plain from a reading 
of § 75,3.f that these considerations have not yet commernrd them- 1· A 
selves to Congress. t--___---
2 The difference is not as great as it might appear to be, how-
ever, because habeas corpus petitioners who wish to proceed in 
Jorma pauperis must still overcome a "non-frivolous" barrier under 
28 U. S. C, § 1915. E . g., Kitchens v. Alderman, 376 F 2d .26~ 
.. 
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argues that this constitutes a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus in violation of Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution. 
This argument presupposes, inter alw, that a right to 
a free transcript is a necessary concommitant of the writ 
which the founders declared could not be suspended. 
This is obviously not the case. The writ of habeas cor-
pus operated until 1944 with no provision for free tran-
scripts for indigents. See 58 Stat. 5, 6 (1944) (28 U.S. C. 
§ 9a (1940 ed. Supp. IV)). Congress, when in that year 
it authorized free transcripts for the first time, could 
certainly have limited the authorization to nonfrivolous 
cases where a need had been shown. If Congress could 
have thus limited the writ directly without "suspending" 
it, it follows that it may do so indirectly. The only pos-
sible objection is a Fifth Amendment due process-equal 
protection claim to which we now turn. 
III 
The Court of Appeals did not technically decide this 
constitutional issue, since it thought it had discovered a 
lacuna in the statute, but its reference to a "constitu-
tional defect" suggests its view on this question. Re-
spondent urges that if the statute is read we now read 
it, it violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and his right "to equal protection." 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does I 
not establish any right to an appeal, see Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12, 18 ( 1956), and certainly does not establish 
any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of con-
viction.3 In this case respondent was granted a statu-
(CA5 1967) , Bl,air v. People of State of California, 340 F. 2d 741 f 
(CA9 1965) . 
8 The constitutional treatment of habeas eorpus , of course, is not 
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tory right of appeal without payment of costs if he 
were an indigent, and had he pursued that right section 
753 (f) would have authorized the use of public funds 
to furnish him a transcript of the trial proceedings with-
out any further showing on his part. Having foregone 
this right, which existed by force of statute only, he may 
not several years later successfully assert a due process 
right to review of his conviction and thereby obtain a 
free transcript on his own terms as an ancillary consti-
tutional benefit. · The conditions which Congress had 
imposed on obtaining such a transcript in § 753 (f) 
are not "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to require their 
invalidation," Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 365 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); rather they "comport 
with fair procedure," Douglas, supra, at 357. 
Although the statutory conditions established in § 753" 
(f) with respect to furnishing a free transcript to mov-
ants in § 2255 proceedings are therefore consistent with 
the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment, it 
is undoubtedly true that they place an indigent in a 
somewhat less advantageous position than a person of 
means. But neither the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the counterpart equal pro-
tection requirement embodied in the Fifth Amendment, 
guarantees "absolute equality or precisely equal advan-
tages," San Antonio Independent Schools District ·V. 
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 24 ( 1973). In the context of a 
criminal proceeding they require only "an adequate op-
portunity to present [one's] claim fairly .... " Ross 
·v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 616 (1974) . .--
In Douglas v. California, supra, the Court held that 
the State must provide counsel for an indigent on his 
first appeal as of right. But in Ross v. Moffitt, supra, 
we declined to extend that holding to a discretionary 
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the Supreme Court of North Carolma. We think the 
distinction between these two holdings of the Court is 
of considerable assistance in resolving respondent's equal 
protection claim. Respondent in this case had an op-
portunity for direct appeal, and had he chosen to pursue 
it he would have been furnished a free transcript of the 
trial proceedings. But having foregone that right, and 
instead some years later seeking to obtain a free tran-
script in order to make the best case he can in a pro-
ceeding under § 2255, respondent stands in a different 
position. 
The Court has held that when a State grants a right 
to collateral review, it may not deny the right to an indi-
gent simply because of inability to pay the required fil-
ing fee, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). There is 
no such impediment here; respondent was permitted to 
proceed in f orma pauperis in his § 2255 action. The 
Court has also held that a State may not confide to the 
public defender the final decision as to whether a tran-
script shall be available to the criminal defendant who 
collaterally attacks his conviction, Lane v. Brown, 372 
U. S. 477 (1963). There the Court observed that the 
state provision "confers upon a state officer outside the 
judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope 
of any appeal at all ." 372 U. S., at 485. 
The congressional statute governing the furnishing of 
free transcripts to plaintiffs in § 2255 actions has no such 
infirmity. The decision as to the provisions of the tran-
script at public expense is made initially by an official 
at the very heart of the judicial system-a district judge 
in the judicial district in which the § 2255 plaintiff was 
tried. The district court has the power to order a free 
transcript furnished if he finds that the "suit ... is not 
frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide 
the issue presented •.•. " 28 U. S. C. § 753 (f). 
8 
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We think that the formula devised by Congress satis-
fies the equal protection components of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Respondent chose to forego his opportunity for 
direct appeal with its attendant unconditional free tran-
script. This choice affects his later equal protection 
claim as well as his due process claim. Equal protec-
tion does not require the Government to furnish to the 
indigent a delayed duplicate of a right of appeal with 
attendant free transcript which it offered in the first 
instance, even though a criminal defendant of means 
might well decide to purchase such a transcript in pur-
suit of relief under § 2255. The basic question is one 
of a.dequacy of respondent's access to procedures for 
review of his conviction, Ross v. Moffitt, supra, and it 
must be decided in the light of avenues which respondent 
chose not to follow as well as those he now seeks to 
· widen. We think it enough at the collateral relief stage 
that Congress has provided that the transcript be paid 
for by public funds if one demonstrates that his § 2255 
claim is not frivolous, and that the transcript is needed 
to decide the issue presented. 
Respondent urged in oral argument that if trial counsel 
· had done a poor job of representing a criminal defendant, 
such counsel might well urge the defendant to forego 
his right of appeal in order to prevent a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel from being raised on the ap-
peal. It is certainly conceivable that such a state of 
facts might exist, notwithstanding the fidelity to the 
interest of their clients demonstrated repeatedly by the 
overwhelming majority of the members of the legal pro-
fession. But § 753 (f) does not require that a § 2255 
plaintiff must prove his claim in order to obtain a tran-
script, but only that he convince the district court that 
such claim is not frivolous. Had the District Court 
nere not been confronted with not merely a conclusory-
'r4-l487-.,--.0P1NIO N 
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1:1,llegations but with some factual allegations indicating 
a denial of respondent's Sixth Amendment right to, 
counsel, together with an additional explicit assertion 
that trial counsel had urged respondent to forego his; 
appeal, that court might have concluded that such a 
claim was not frivolous, and further decided that a free 
transcript should be furnished pursuant to § 753 (f). 4 
But that is not our case. Respondent made only a 
naked allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Since any discussion he may have had with his triaI 
counsel as to the desirability of appeal would not nor-
mally appear in the transcript of proceedings at trialr 
the furnishing of such transcript would not have aided 
him in refreshing his recollection of such discussions. 
The failure to flesh out this aspect of respondent's claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, then, is not likely 
to have been cured by a transcript. 
We think this is an area of the law where the opinions 
of the courts of appeals are entitled to particular-
weight, since they represent not only expositions of 
federal and constitutional law, but also expressions of 
essentially practical judgment on questions which those 
courts must confront far more than we do. The fact 
that with the exception of the decision presently under 
review they have unanimously concluded that the condi-
tions established by § 753 (f} for the furnishing of a 
free transcript do not violate the Fifth Amendment is-
significant.5 A practical reason for their conclusion is 
4 Since a § 2255 claim is usually pre~entrd to the trial judge he 
will likely have an independent recollcrtion of counsel's performance 
which may well lead him to conclude that a movant's claim is· 
nonfrivolous 
5 E. g., Ellis v. State of Maine, 448 F. 2d 1325 (CAl 1971); 
United States ex rel. Buford v. Henderson, 524 F. 2d 147 (CA2 
1975) ; United State& 'll . Shoaf, 341 F . 2d 832 (CA4 1964); United' 
10 
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well expressed by Judge Haynsworth in United States v. 
Shoaf, 341 F. 2d 832 (CA4 1964), in which he said for 
that court : 
"The usual grounds for successful collateral attacks 
upon convictions arise out of occurrences outside 
of the courtroom or of events in the courtroom of 
which the defendant was aware and can recall with-
out the need of having his memory refreshed by 
reading a transcript. He may well have need of a 
transcript ( to support his claim) but rarely, if 
ever, ... to become aware of the events or occur-
rences which constitute a ground for collateral at-
tack." 341 F. 2d, at 835.6 
We conclude that the fact that a transcript was avail-
able had respondent chosen to appeal from his convic-
tion, and remained available on the conditions set forth 
in § 753 to an indigent proceeding under § 2255, afforded 
respondent an adequate opportunity to attack his con-
viction. To hold otherwise would be to place the indi-
gent defendant in a more favorable position than a 
similarly situated prisoner of some, but not unlimited, 
means, who presumably would make an evaluation much 
like that prescribed in § 753 (f) before he spent his own 
funds for a transcript. 
" ... [T]he fact that a particular service might be 
of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean 
that the service is constitutionally required. The 
States v. Herrara, 474 F. 2d 1049 (CA5 1973) ; Hoover v. United 
States, 416 F. 2d 432 (CA6 1969); United States ex rel. Nunes v. 
Nelson, 467 F. 2d 1380 (CA9 1972) (habeas corpus); Taylor v. 
United States, 238 F . 2d 409 (CA9 1956) (§ 2255 motion); Hines 
v. Baker, 422 F. 2d 1002 (CAlO 1970) . 
6 This op1mon and othn aspects of th1~ quest10n were thoroughly 
discussed shortly after the 1965 amendment to § 753 (f) in Black-
mun, In Forma Paupe-ns Appeals, 43 F . R D a43 (1967) . 
74---14 7-0PINTON 
UNITED STATE'S v. MAcCOLLOM 11 
duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate 
the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by 
a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse 
his conviction, but only to assure the defendant of 
an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly 
in the context of the State's appellate process." 
Ross v. Moffitt, supra, at 616. 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I join my Brother Stevens' 
to record my disagreement with the Court's holding tha~ e 
ment' s refusal to furnish an indigent defendant a free trial transcript 
in a proceeding under 28 U.S. C. § 2255, upon merely a showing of 
indigency, does not deny respondent Equal Protection of the law secured 
against the federal government, as the Court concedes1 through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 87 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975). 
"(T]he central aim of our entire judicial system (is that] all 
people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 1 stand 
on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court, "' 
Griffinv. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956), for this is a "country 
dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none 
in the administration of its criminal law." Id.; at 19. "Our decisions 
for more than a decade now have made clear that differences in access 
to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon 
the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution. 11 
Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U. S. 40, 42, ( 1967). Thus, in Griffin, the 
Court held that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate 







351 U. S., at 19, and/therefore the State must furnish the indigent 
defendant with a free trial transcript for purposes of direct appeal. 
The Griffin principle of equality was not limited to transcripts 
for purposes of direct appellate review. In Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 
708 (1961), the Court invalidated a filing fee for state habeas corpus 
as applied to indigents. The invalidation was held to be required by 
an earlier decision holding that a State could not require an indigent 
to pay a filing fee before being allowed to appeal in one of its courts. 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). Later, Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
477, 484 (1963), held that "Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle 
also applies to state collateral proceedings •... " 
The Griffin equality principle was next applied to require that 
a State supply a free transcript to an indigent who brought a state 
collateral procedure. In Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 ( 1966), 
the Court, stating that "having established a post-conviction procedure, 
a State cannot condition its availability to an indigent upon any financial 
consideration, 11 held that an indigent defendant must be furnished a free 
transcript in state habeas proceedings for purposes of appeal from a 
denial of that relief. And in Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 ( 1969), 
the Court went still further and required the furnishing of a transcript 
of a habeas proceeding for the purposes of a second such proceeding. 
Thus, the Court's holding today that respondent may be required to 




for purposes of collateral review is a plain departure from Griffin 
and its progeny. 
The denial in this case is particularly egregious, for one of 
respondent's claims on the merits was that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. Substantiation of such a claim is virtually 
impossible without the aid of a trial transcript. Yet the Court deni-
grates respondent's claim as a "naked allegation. 11 Slip opinion, at 8. 
Essentially, therefore, he is denied a transcript for making an 
unsubstantiated allegation, an allegation that obviously he cannot 
1/ 
establish without a transcript. 
It bears emphasis . that where, as here, denial of equal protection 
is the issue, it matters not, under our cases, that the indigent had a 
fair opportunity to present a defense and have his conviction reviewed 
on direct appeal. The unfairness born of discrimination denying equal 
protection is as offensive to the Constitution as any unfairness resulting 
from procedural deficiencies in the criminal system. Thus, I cannot 
accept the Court's argument that respondent could constitutionally be 
denied a free transcript because 11 [r ]espondent in this case had an 
opportunity for direct appeal, and had he chosen to pursue it he would 
have been furnished a free transcript of the trial proceedings." Slip 
opinion, at 6. The Constitution demands that respondent, despite his 
indigency, be afforded the same opportunity for collateral review of 
2/ 




policy of allowing [collateral relief], it cannot make lack of means an 
effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity. The [Government) 
cannot keep the word of promise to the ear of those illegally convicted 
and break it to their hope. 11 Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 24 (Frankfurter, 
J. , concur ring in the judgment). 
The Court's reliance upon Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619 
(1974), for the proposition that "[i)n the context of a criminal proceeding 
[equal protection) require [s] only 'an adequate opportunity to present his_ 
claims fairly"' is patently misplaced. This quote from Ross, read in 
context, speaks not merely to equality of opportunity in the overall 
criminal process, but also to equality of opportunity at any stage of the 
process where . the validity of the defendant's restraint 
or conviction is the _primary consideration. 
I reject as wholly fallacious the argument that adequacy of 
opportunity to present claims at trial and on direct appeal so far 
diminishes the importance of collateral review, that discrimination 
between indigent and nonindigent in post- conviction proceedings is 
constitutionally tolerable. That argument is i:rp.plicitly if not explicitly 
rejected in the unbroken line of our decisions that make no distinction, 
for purposes of equal protection analysis, between collateral proceedings 1, 
and trials and direct appeals. Any distinction must necessarily be 
constitutionally intolerable where the stakes are no less than the 
constitutionality of a criminal conviction. Any distinction would also . 
< 
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be plainly inconsistent with the explicit recognition given habeas corpus 
in Art. I, §9, Cl. 2 of the Constitution. See F~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
399-403 (1963). And for federal prisoners, "history makes clear that 
§2255 was intended to afford prisoners a remedy identical in scope to 
federal habeas corpus." Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). 
Today's decision and others this Tenn such as United States v. 
Mandujano, __ U.S. ___ (1976), empty of all promise the Court's 
assurance only six years ago that decisions applying Griffin "have 
pointedly demonstrated that the passage of time has heightened rather 
than weakened the attempts [by this Court] to mitigate the disparate 
treatment of indigents in the criminal process." Williams v. Illinois, 
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Respondent's oth~r allegation was insufficiency of the 
evidence. Two of our decisions plainly indicate that this alle-
gation suffices to require provision of a verbatim transcript. 
See Maye1:_v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Draper v. 
W£>.shington, supra. Mayer also indicated that an allegation of 
prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, 404 U.S., at 198, also re-
quires provision of a transcript. That claim, for purposes of 
substantiation on appeal or collateral review,is like respondent' s 
first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mayer, 404 U.S., 
at 195, held that where the grounds of appeal are insufficiency of 
the evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant need only 
"make out a colorable need for a complete transcript" in order to 
be entitled to it. 
]:.I 
Indeed, in Burns v. Ohio, supra, a filin~ fee for direct appeals 
was held invalid as applied to indigent even though the indigent petitioner 
there had already received one appellate review of his conviction. As 
the Court then stated: 
"[T]he State argues that petitioner received one appellate 
review of his conviction in Ohio, while in Griffin, Illinois 
had left the defendant without any judicial review of his 
conviction. This is a distinction without a difference for, 
as Griffin holds, once the State chooses to establish appel-
late review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents 
from access to any phase of that procedure because of their 
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